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NATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND FIRM 






We analyse the relationship between institutional systems (configurations of countries with similar 
institutional characteristics) and firm performance. We use a large sample of firms from understudied 
countries to explore whether the performance impact of these configurations is the same (“equifinality”), 
whether this holds across different measures of firm performance (“Tversky effect”), and whether some 
institutional configurations better support foreign-owned firms. We find that it is possible to rank 
institutional systems according to their impact on firm performance, but the ranking differs according to 
the performance measure. Although foreign ownership on average confers performance advantages, the 
magnitude of the impact depends on the configuration. Our findings contribute to the understanding of the 
importance of institutional similarities across countries, and to the implications of these similarities for 
the theory of the MNE. 
  
Keywords: Varieties of Institutional Systems, Comparative Corporate Governance; Firm Performance; 





 A central tenet of the international business (IB) literature is that institutions matter (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008b; Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008; Peng, Sun, Pinkham & Chen, 2009). In particular, 
institutional differences across countries can help explain the existence of “country effects” as 
determinants of differential firm performance (Makino, Isobe & Chan, 2004; Gao, Murray, Kotabe & Lu, 
2010; Bamiatzi, Bozos, Cavusgil & Hult, 2016) as well as location (Globerman & Shapiro, 2002; Bevan, 
Estrin & Meyer, 2004; Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet & Mayer, 2007) and entry mode choices  by multinational 
firms (Brouthers, 2002;  Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik & Peng, 2009). These institutional differences have 
arguably become more important as emerging markets add heterogeneity to the institutional spectrum 
(Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008; Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev & Peng, 2013). 
 At the same time, there is a long intellectual history built around the analysis of the performance 
effects of economic systems: groupings of countries that share similar institutional characteristics 
(Koopmans & Montias 1971; Ostrom, 2009).  One prominent example is the Varieties of Capitalism 
(VOC) perspective (Hall & Soskice, 2001) where it is argued that even within a single economic system, 
capitalism, countries could usefully be grouped in typologies based on institutional similarities, resulting 
in a “remarkable convergence on just a few configurations (Boyer, 2005, p. 13). Hall and Soskice looked 
at a relatively small group of developed economies in North America and Europe and identified two main 
variants of capitalism, Liberal Market (LME) and Coordinated Market (CME) economies. Importantly, in 
their approach, the two systems can generate the same levels of national and company performance, 
resulting in an outcome termed equifinality.  
Subsequent scholarship on capitalist variety relies less on establishing typologies such as the 
VOC, and more on the development of empirically derived taxonomies of institutional systems (Hall & 
Gingerich, 2009; Schneider & Paunescu, 2012; Witt & Redding, 2013). To date, most scholars have 
restricted their analysis to developed countries, where institutions are stronger and arguably have a 
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different impact from those in emerging markets (Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008). The major exception is 
Fainshmidt, Judge, Aguilera, and Smith (henceforth FJAS, 2016) who exploit known features of 
institutional structures in understudied emerging and developing countries to create a novel framework, 
which they refer to as Varieties of Institutional Systems (VIS). FJAS's focus on understudied countries is 
a welcome addition to the literature on capitalist variety, as scholars have criticized the VOC for its 
almost exclusive focus on mature OECD member economies (Allen, 2004).  The VIS taxonomy consists 
of seven distinct, empirically derived national institutional systems, henceforth termed configurations, 
and  incorporates factors considered to be relevant to the emerging market context such as the role of the 
state and diversified family business groups (Estrin, Meyer, Nielsen & Nielsen, 2016; Carney, Estrin, van 
Essen & Shapiro, 2017). However, to date, the performance implications of these systems have not been 
addressed. 
In this paper, we pursue two related broad research questions that both extend and link the 
literature on institutional systems and international business. Our first research question asks whether the 
institutional systems defined by FJAS exhibit equifinality, and if so whether that outcome holds for all 
performance measures (which we refer to as the Tversky effect). We argue that, in contrast to VOC,  when 
we extend the scope of the analysis to emerging markets, equifinality as measured by firm performance 
across national systems, will not hold. We hypothesize that in the context of these understudied countries, 
some configurations are better at supporting firm performance than others - (H1) - and we test this 
hypothesis using firm-level data. Our results establish that performance does vary across configurations 
and equifinality is therefore rejected. 
We extend the analysis in our first research question by building on an insight of Tversky (1977) 
that the ranking of alternatives is context dependent. We apply this argument to the relationship between 
firm performance and institutional configurations.  This extension leads us to offer a novel theory-based 
hypothesis suggesting that the relative impact (ranking) of the configurations on firm performance will 
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differ according to the performance measure chosen. Specifically, we propose that there will be variation 
in the extent to which different configurations support alternative dimensions of firm performance (H2). 
We also find evidence confirming this hypothesis from our sample of understudied countries. 
Our second research question asks whether national institutional systems affect the performance 
of foreign-owned firms in these understudied countries. Here, we both extend the IB literature and link it 
to the literature on institutions. Specifically, we first draw on the familiar OLI (eclectic) paradigm, and its 
variations (Dunning, 1988; Rugman & Verbeke, 1990; Hennart, 2009) to explore whether the firm-
specific advantages associated with foreign-owned firms (FOEs) and internally transfered through 
majority ownership provide these firms with performance advantages in understudied countries (H3). 
This proposition  has been widely supported for developed economies (Caves, 1996; Estrin,  Hanousek,  
Kočenda, & Svejnar, 2009)  but  has not been tested in a cross-national sample of emerging market 
countries, where institutional heterogeneity is greater, instutional voids and regulatory barriers are higher 
and therefore the liability of foreigness is higher (Khanna and Paleu, 2010; Wright, Filtatotchev, 
Hoskisson and Peng, 2005; Zaheer, 1995) . Our results suggest that FOEs do display performance 
advantages over domestic firms, even in these understudied economies. On this basis, we then extend the 
framework to account for the effects of national institutional systems, by proposing that magnitude of the 
positive foreign ownership performance effects are contingent on the configuration to which the host 
economy belongs (H4).  Thus we suggest and find empirical support for the argument that, that some 
configurations provide better institutional support for the ownership advantages of FOEs than others. Our 
findings indicate that institutional similarities among countries as captured in our configurations, are 
important determinants of both domestic and foreign-owned firm performance, and should therefore be 




From an empirical perspective, we develop a unique dataset that combines the seven FJAS 
configurations (see Table 1) with firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES), 
resulting in a sample of over 50,000 firms from 57 understudied countries, including emerging capitalist, 
former socialist and socialist ones. Thus, we pursue the suggestion of FJAS that they provide an 
“improved platform for scholars examining the implications of cross-national institutional differences for 
organizations embedded in different types of institutional systems” (FJAS, p. 2).  In bringing together the 
FJAS taxonomy and the World Bank microdata, we not only extend the theoretical and empirical 
understanding of institutional systems, but we also link that understanding to the theory of the MNE. 
We conclude that the study of national institutional systems, when extended to understudied 
economies, reveals a considerable variation in institutional architectures, which differentially affect the 
performance of firms, both foreign and domestic, embedded in them. While we find that some systems 
better support firm performance than others, we also find heterogeneity among the better-performing 
systems. Our findings caution against the use of oversimplified categories to describe these countries, but 
also suggest the theoretical and empirical relevance of national institutional systems in analysing the 
country-specific (location) advantages of emerging markets.    
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
National institutional systems provide the formal and informal rules of the game to which domestic and 
foreign firms must adapt their governance and ownership structures (North, 1990). One strand of the 
corporate governance literature suggests that national and firm-level systems of corporate governance 
were converging on a single ‘best’ form of economic governance, as manifested in an Anglo-Saxon, 
capital market-driven investment regime characterized by a sharp separation between ownership and 
control and secure legal protection for minority investors (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2004). Related to this, 
a shareholder value model emerged prescribing codes of best corporate governance practice: a vigilant 
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board of independent directors; the separation of key leadership roles; and compensation systems aligning 
shareholder and top management interests (Lazonick & O'Sullivan, 2000). This liberal market economy 
(LME) view of national and firm-level corporate governance configuration encapsulates the notion of 
unifinality, in which across the variety of possible institutional arrangements there exists an optimal 
configuration of institutions for economic performance (Fiss, 2007). In contrast, Hall and Soskice (2001) 
argue that within the developed capitalist world, other institutional systems, notably what they refer to as 
coordinated market economies (CME), can be as high performing as LMEs, consistent with equifinality, 
whereby different systems produce similar economic outcomes (see also Judge, Fainshmidt & Brown, 
2014). 
 An earlier example of this type of debate arose in the 1920s over whether socialist states could 
design an economic system that would match the capitalist system (see Levy & Pert, 2008, for a 
summary). At its heart was the question of whether two fundamentally different economic systems could 
perform equally well; that is, whether there could be equifinality of economic outcomes. The tenor of the 
argument did not support the idea of equifinality, and neither did the actual comparative performance of 
the systems, which suggested unifinality (Kornai, 1992).  
 Institutional configurations and firm performance  
We first consider why differences in institutional and governance systems might explain cross-national 
differences in firm performance (Aguilera & Crespi-Cladera, 2016). The VOC literature (Hall & Soskice, 
2001; Amable, 2003; Hancké, Rhodes & Thatcher, 2007) identifies a social democratic economic model 
of capitalism in north European countries as a viable alternative architecture of national competitiveness 
to liberal market economies. There are two ideas at the heart of the VOC model: complementarity and 
isomorphism. First, a nation-state can provide a performance advantage to its firms if it achieves 
complementarity between institutional spheres, including the financial sector, the labor, and industrial 
relations regime, and the educational and skills training systems. Actors in each institutional sphere are 
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perceived as politically rational, having an acute sense of their interests but recognizing the power of 
cooperation and negotiation to achieve collective ends (Hall & Thelen, 2009). Thus, institutional variation 
arises from the way different national institutional systems achieve cohesion and ways of ‘hanging 
together’ (FJAS) to support high-performing firms and achieve high economic growth (Peck & Zhang, 
2013).  
The focus of this approach is therefore on the institutional complementarities within countries that 
co-evolve with those of other countries to produce distinct governance configurations. Thus, no single 
institutional characteristic is sufficient to explain outcomes; instead, the outcome is related to 
combinations of conditions (Fiss, 2007) often identified via fuzzy set and clustering analysis (Hotho, 
2014). This strand of research has been able both to identify fine-grained configurations and to evaluate 
their impact on a number of different national economic outcomes including foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows (Pajunen, 2008), exports (Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop & Paunescu, 2010), national growth 
rates (Hall & Gingerich, 2009), and economic equality (Judge, Fainshmidt & Brown, 2014) as well as 
different national corporate governance systems (Haxhi & Aguilera, 2016; Iannotta, Gatti & Huse, 2016).  
 The second key concept is isomorphism. Each variety of capitalism is said to produce an 
‘emblematic firm’ (Boyer, 2005), an organisational form particularly well adapted to its national 
institutional system. In the LME, the emblematic firm is a capital market-governed, managerially 
controlled, shareholder value-maximizing firm, whereas the emblematic firm in CME is a bank-centered, 
stakeholder-oriented firm. More recently, the high-performing Asian variety of capitalism model views 
the diversified business group as the emblematic form of corporate organization (Carney, Gedajlovic, & 
Yang, 2009)
2
. The institutional system, therefore, supplies firms with ‘institutional capital’ so that firms 
fit, or become isomorphic with, prevailing modes of institutional functioning. National institutional 
                                                 
2
 There is also evidence to suggest that the adoption of best practice Western models of corporate governance Is not 
effective in China (Chen, Li & Shapiro, 2011). 
9 
 
systems will differ in the way they influence the structure of emblematic firms, and their capacity to 
accommodate non-emblematic firms, and isomorphic processes in different configurations, therefore, 
result in varied forms of comparative institutional advantage (Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop & Paunescu, 
2010). Thus, as firms strive to access resources in their local environment, they are likely to develop 
similar practices adapted to their particular institutional configuration (Hall & Soskice, 2001).  
 The original VOC arguments derived from studies of a limited group of developed economies.  
Indeed, critics of the VOC seized on its Euro-centricity, noting that VOC did not adequately capture the 
variety of institutional configurations found around the world (Allen, 2004). Boyer suggested that there 
would be ‘an even larger diversity for emerging economies’ (Boyer, 2005, p.15) and other theoretical 
approaches identified new typologies (Whitley, 1999; Amable, 2003). An important methodological 
innovation was the application of clustering and fuzzy set theory to derive taxonomies based upon 
multiple measurements of national institutional characteristics (Hotho, 2014). Applying fuzzy set 
analysis, FJAS identify seven distinct configurations among emerging, developing and transition 
countries. Nevertheless, with the growing interest in taxonomical elaboration, the question of impact on 
firm performance at the heart of the earlier literature has faded, and to our knowledge, very few have 
considered the firm-level performance implications of different configurations.  
 The link between the capitalist taxonomy literature and their performance consequences remains 
central, however, because the VIS and VOC literature both claim to explain the country-specific 
institutional basis of firm-level competitive advantage. Hence it is a significant research question to 
explore the firm-level performance effects of these new institutional configurations identified outside 
developed OECD countries. VOC scholars have already raised questions about the relevance of 
complementarity amongst the institutional contradictions and frictions of less developed economies and 
obvious cases of dysfunctional varieties of capitalism also challenge the idea of equifinality (Howell, 
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2003; Hancké, Rhodes & Thatcher, 2007; Peck & Zhang, 2013)
3
. Widening the geographic lens to 
emerging markets in Asia, Latin America and Africa, a more variegated range of capitalisms come into 
view comprising dynamic ‘rising powers’ (Sinkovics, Yamin, Nadvi & Zhang, 2014). Other scholars 
describe static capitalist economies mired in a middle-income trap and low skill equilibria (Schneider, 
2009); and even outright failures (Wood & Frynas, 2006).  
 In the OECD, we find some developed countries which have achieved complementarity and firm 
isomorphism in one way or another, leading to higher levels of national and firm economic performance. 
In contrast, we expect to find greater variability in the extent to which institutional systems are moving 
toward such complementarity and firm isomorphism in emerging economies. This is because some states 
are dynamically transforming their institutional systems with far-reaching institution-building projects, 
while others have stagnated as states appear to accept the existing institutional equilibrium. The resulting 
heterogeneity may lead to more significant differences in firm performance across configurations.  Using 
the VIS framework, (see Table 1 for the composition of each configuration), we can identify different 
institutional templates that might produce similar or different effects on firm performance. For example, 
there is some evidence in the literature that, the state and economic actors in FJAS’s emerging LME and 
state-led configurations would seek resolution of institutional contradictions, with firms dynamically 
adapting in the process (Peck & Zhang, 2013). Alternatively, other VIS configurations may have already 
settled into a stable institutional equilibrium; for example, the family-led configuration dominated by 
powerful rent-seeking business groups, which resist institutional developments that challenge their rents 
(Morck, 2010; Carney, Duran, van Essen & Shapiro, 2017). In this institutional configuration, we expect 
that firms will face obstacles to achieving efficiency because these countries lack the relevant 
complementarity and contain contradictions that fail to provide a sustained institutional advantage. 
                                                 
3
 Even within the Europe, an underperforming group of Mediterranean varieties of capitalism has been identified (Amable, 
2003) while at the European periphery, Cernat (2006) describes an incoherent form of “cocktail capitalism” and Nölke & 
Vliegenthart (2009) refer to “dependent-market” capitalism. 
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Hence, we expect that the configurations identified by FJAS will vary in their capacities to provide the 
institutional frameworks that support competitive firms; as a result, we do not expect equifinality across 
systems.  
Hypothesis 1: Firms operating in different institutional configurations will display differentiated levels of 
economic performance (no equifinality). 
 
Institutional configurations and different measures of performance 
 In a classic article, Tversky (1977) argued that similarity measures based on distance could at 
times violate simple axioms of minimality, symmetry, and triangle inequality (Tversky, 1977, p. 328). 
For example, symmetry would require that if country A is judged to be similar to country B, then country 
B must also be similar to country A.  In our context, this implies that countries should belong to the same 
configuration regardless of whether one begins with A or B. Tversky provides the counter-example of 
China and North Korea, whereby North Korea is judged to be more similar to China than China is to 
North Korea and suggests that the differences arise because China and North Korea have multiple 
attributes, and depending on the context there may be asymmetrical judgments about which are relevant.  
 Thus, measures of similarity derived from multiple attributes and created by using distance 
measures may fail these logical tests. Taxonomies derived through cluster analysis fall into this category. 
Indeed, FJAS rely on a two-step clustering procedure which uses log-likelihood distance rather than 
squared Euclidean distance, and this includes both continuous and dichotomous variables (FJAS, 2016, p. 
9). This procedure is appropriate to their data but, in using them, it is important to carefully consider the 
implications of Tversky’s arguments about the asymmetries of effects; namely whether two 
configurations can be judged to be similar in one analytical context, but not in another. Thus, two 
configurations found to be equally favourable to enhancing one aspect of firm performance may not be 
equally favourable concerning another. That is, a configuration’s multiple attributes may be seen 
differently (asymmetrically) depending on the activity the firm is considering, and so the value (ranking) 
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of any configuration may vary according to the activity. This implies that conclusions regarding 
equifinality will be contingent on the performance measure under consideration. 
 Thus, arguments drawing on classifications that are based on multiple attributes and derive from 
measures of distance, such as the institutional configurations of VIS, must be considered as being context 
dependent. Therefore, we hypothesize that rankings or comparisons of configurations derived from firm 
performance may yield different results depending on the particular performance measure chosen.  
Hypothesis 2: The impact (ranking) of any given configuration on firm performance will vary according 
to the way that firm performance is measured. 
 
Foreign Ownership 
We now address the question of whether foreign-owned firms (FOEs) have performance advantages over 
domestically owned firms (DOEs), and most importantly whether these advantages (if they exist) vary 
with the institutional context.   
 The traditional view in the IB literature is that FOEs benefit from the ownership of tangible and 
intangible assets (O advantages) that can be internally transferred to the host market to provide a 
performance advantage in the host market, a view summarized in Dunning’s OLI model (Dunning, 1988; 
Rugman & Verbeke, 1990). Despite the liability of foreignness associated with operating abroad (Zaheer, 
1995), there is ample empirical evidence from developed economy host markets that foreign-owned firms 
do display such performance advantages (Davies & Lyons, 1991; Bellak, 2004). However, it is not at all 
clear that the positive foreign ownership effect will hold in transitional, emerging and developing 
markets, for two reasons. First, it is likely the case that the institutional environment in these countries 
enhances the liabilities of foreignness (Eden & Miller, 2004; Gaur, Kumar & Sarathy, 2011), and 
therefore dissipates the advantages of FOEs. For example, institutional voids may result in the emergence 
of powerful business groups (Carney, van Essen, Estrin, & Shapiro, 2018) whose structures and relations 
to political elites may be quite different from those of FOEs. Thus, FOEs, do not fit well in the local 
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institutional environment, which may negatively affect their performance. Second, because many of the 
FOEs in emerging markets may originate in other emerging markets, they may lack the firm-specific 
assets underlying the positive performance effects (Ramamurti, 2009, and 2012; Rugman, 2009; 
Gammeltoft, Barnard & Madhok, 2010)
4
.  As noted by Peng (2012, p. 99), a “big chunk of the O” may be 
missing for EMNEs, thus resulting in limited performance advantages. 
 Despite these possibilities, we follow Dunning (1988) and Rugman (2009) in proposing that all 
FOEs including EMNEs must possess some FSA to overcome the liabilities of foreignness. At the same 
time, we acknowledge that the nature of the FSAs may differ between FOEs from emerging and 
developed countries (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Ramamurti, 2009; Bhaumik, Driffield & Zhou, 
2016). While MNEs from developed countries may rely on more traditional sources of competitive 
advantage related to the ownership of internalized intangible assets, EMNEs may possess advantages 
related to their networking skills and ability to navigate through more difficult institutional environments 
(Erdener & Shapiro, 2005; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). This argument is stronger because 
knowledge-seeking motives for FDI in the set of countries considered in this study are for the most part 
unlikely.  
 It then follows that the internalization process should protect these advantages. Given that weak 
institutions and market failures characterize the countries we study, internalization theory would suggest 
that FOEs will transfer their FSAs abroad through majority ownership (Dunning, 1988; Rugman & 
Verbeke, 1990; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Makino & Neupert, 2000).
5
 We support this reasoning with 
property rights theory, which suggests that when a firm possesses distinct assets that are internationally 
transferable, it should exercise greater control over those assets  since control provides the firm with 
                                                 
4
 Rather, emerging market multinationals (EMNEs) are often argued to be motivated by other factors such as strategic asset 
seeking (Meyer, 2015) or learning (Mathews, 2006). 
5
 Majority control does not rule out some level of local minority ownership to assist in navigating institutional voids (Meyer, 
Estrin, Bhaumik & Peng, 2009). 
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safeguards that can protect their assets from misappropriation (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Driffield, 
Mickiewicz & Temouri, 2016)  and facilitates the operation of internal capital markets (Gugler, Peev & 
Segalla, 2013).  Similarly, with the diffusion of ownership and control, the firm may experience high 
agency costs that dissipate its ownership advantage and negatively impact its performance (Boardman, 
Shapiro & Vining, 1997; Douma, George & Kabir, 2006). There is limited direct evidence on the relative 
performance of FOEs in emerging markets, but the available evidence does point to a positive 
performance effects of FOEs in India (Douma, George & Kabir, 2006) and of privatization to FOEs in 
transition economies (Estrin, Hanousek, Kocenda & Svejnar, 2009).  Based on these arguments, we 
expect that majority-owned FOEs will benefit from the internal transfer of valuable intangible assets from 
their parents, and this will, in turn, provide them with performance advantages in emerging markets.  
Hence, we argue: 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with majority foreign ownership will display superior levels of economic 
performance compared with other domestically owned firms operating in the host economy market. 
 
Interaction of foreign ownership and institutional configurations  
If FOEs possess performance advantages, do they vary across institutional systems? Many 
scholars argue that foreign firms are more likely to succeed when they can match their FSAs with the host 
country-specific locational advantages (CSAs), which include resources, market size, and institutions 
(Rugman & Verbeke, 1990; Driffield et al, 2016). Thus, it is the interaction between the FSAs of the firm 
and CSAs of the host country that drives the performance of an FOE in any particular country. Hennart 
(2009) refers to the “bundling” of firm-specific and complementary country-specific advantages. This 
explanation is likely to be of particular relevance in emerging markets, where MNEs need to combine 
their proprietary assets with local country assets which are often very specific, such as access to 
gatekeepers or knowledge of local networks (Shi, Sun, Pinkham & Peng, 2014).  There is, in fact, already 
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some evidence that the performance of foreign-owned subsidiaries depends on the institutional 
characteristics of the host country (Gugler, Mueller, Peev & Segalla, 2013). 
While FSAs are unique to a firm, CSAs are usually seen as public goods freely available to all 
market participants within a country (Dunning & Lundan, 2008a, p. 96). Hennart (2009, 2012) questions 
this assumption and suggests that the market for acquiring local complementary assets is imperfect so that 
some institutional structures are more likely to facilitate firms’ access to CSAs than others. Regarding the 
previous discussion, this would imply that some institutional systems can more effectively generate 
complementarities for foreign firms and assuming that countries in specific institutional configurations 
share these qualities, then there will be systematic variation in the relationship between institutional 
configurations and FOE performance. Thus, we expect some emerging market institutional configurations 
to present particularly strong challenges to FOEs, while others provide a more fruitful context supporting 
firm performance.  
 We, therefore, argue that the ownership advantage of (majority owned) FOEs is moderated by the 
institutional configuration of the country in which they operate; that is, FOEs operating in different 
institutional configurations will display differentiated levels of economic performance. Hence, we 
hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 4: The performance benefits of majority foreign-owned firms are moderated by the 
institutional configuration in which the host country belongs. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
We use the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) database for our empirical analysis 
(http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/enterprise-surveys). This is a cross-section time-series panel of 
enterprise data collected by surveys of over 120,000 firms in more than 130 countries across Asia, Latin 
America, Eastern and Central Europe, and Africa between 2006 and 2016 (World Bank, 2011). The 
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sampling is stratified and random with replacement, constructed to be representative of the country-level 
with respect to firm size, business sector, and geographic region and undertaken in waves at different 
dates over the period, with some countries having only one wave (e.g. Brazil and India), most having two 
and a few having three (e.g. Bulgaria and the DR Congo). WBES data have been used widely in 
economics and development economic studies (see, e.g. Harrison, Lin, & Xu, 2014; Mitton, 2016; World 
Bank, 2018, Chapter 2) and are now beginning to be used in IB research (Jensen, Li & Rahman, 2010; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016).  
 FJAS created their VIS typology of institutional systems for understudied economies to 
incorporate numerous emerging markets including many within the World Bank dataset. They rely on a 
panel of experts to identify seven distinct national institutional systems that categorize governance 
arrangement for 68 understudied countries. The full list, which also encompasses the two developed 
economy VOC categories, is contained in their Appendix A1 and is reproduced as Table 1 below. Of the 
68 countries in VIS, the WBES dataset covers 57. Table 2 lists them and shows how they fit into the 
seven VIS configurations of understudied economies, as well as providing information about the number 
of firms in each country sample. Our maximum sample contains over 86,000 firms, but the deletion of 
some firms described below results in a sample of some 55,000 firms.  Since there are no observations for 
any countries in configuration 4 (centralized tribe) in the WBER sample, this configuration cannot be 




-Tables 1 & 2: about here- 
Dependent Variables  
 
We employ two different measures of firm-level performance. The first is labor productivity, a measure 
of firm-specific advantage (Zaheer, 1995; Caves, 1996), defined in the WBES as real sales per worker. 
                                                 
6
 In addition, WBES has no data on Hong Kong and Singapore and are not covered in the emergent LME configuration 5, and 
for the same reason South Korea and Taiwan are not covered in configuration 7.  
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The second is exports (percentage of sales exported), a measure of the firm’s ability to compete in the 
global economy (He, Brouthers & Filatotchev, 2013). Variable definitions and sources for all dependent 
and independent variables are reported in Table 3. 
-Table 3: about here- 
Independent Variables 
We use dummy variables to allocate each of the 57 countries in the sample to the appropriate one of the 
six available VIS configurations presented in Table 1. In our regressions, we always use as our point of 
reference configuration 5, emergent liberal market economies (ELMEs); this represents for our sample of 
understudied economies the institutional system closest to the traditional Anglo-Saxon governance model.  
We thus have 5 dummy variables corresponding to the FJAS national institutional systems or 
configurations, henceforth denoted configs. We analyse foreign ownership in terms of majority ownership 
and so load it as a dummy variable taking the value unity when foreigners own more than 50% of the 
equity in the firm.  
Control Variables 
To avoid omitted variable bias, we need to control for a large number of other factors likely to influence 
firm performance, (see e.g. Hansen and Wernerfelt, 1989; Bhaumik, Driffield & Zhou, 2016).  The most 
important of these for cross country studies is the level of national economic development (Meyer, Estrin, 
Bhaumik & Peng, 2009), which we measure as GDP per capita, measured in logs to address potential 
non-linearity in the impact of GDP per capita. We noted above that many FOEs in our sample are 
themselves from other emerging markets so their firm specific advantages may not be adequately 
captured by either productivity or exports (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Ramamurti, 2012). To control 
for this, we use country-level data on the source of FDI, namely the percentage of the FDI stock derived 
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from developed economies, measured in logs
7
. In addition to controlling for possible differences in 
performance between FOEs from developing and developed countries, this variable may also control for 
the possibility that FOEs from developed countries provide greater spillover benefits. For these reasons, 
we expect firm performance to be higher the greater the percentage of FDI to a host economy from 
developed economies. We also employ a variety of firm-level controls for company performance, all 
entered in logs. In particular, we follow the literature in including a measure of firm size; larger firms are 
typically associated with higher levels of productivity and exports (Hall & Weiss, 1967; Bonaccorsi, 
1992). The second control stressed by the literature is the age of the firm, with older firms normally 
associated with better performance (Moen, 1999).  
  In understudied economies, where institutions are less developed than in advanced market 
economies, some hybrid or mixed ownership structures may be more beneficial for firm performance 
(Khanna & Palepu, 1999). Bringing together diverse groups of owners (private, state, foreign) with access 
to different resources may provide distinctive channels for accessing and assembling the kinds of 
resources required for effective performance. Accordingly, following Chen, Li, Shapiro & Zhang (2014), 
we introduce a control for ownership hybridity which measures the degree to which ownership is 
diversified by type of owner (foreign, state, private domestic). Ownership Hybridity is defined in Table 3 
and is expected to have a positive effect on firm performance. Finally, we control for industry and year 
fixed effects.  
Our base sample uses a sub-sample of the (relevant part of) the WBES dataset in which small 
firms (fewer than 10 workers), and state-owned firms (the state owns more than 50% of the firm’s equity) 
are excluded because these increase the heterogeneity of the sample without increasing variation relevant 
to our hypotheses. In robustness tests, we re-estimate both the productivity and export equations on 
samples which include state-owned and small firms respectively (denoted the full WBES sample). In the 
                                                 
7
 We are not able to identify the home economy of FOEs in our dataset.  
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former case, we also control for state ownership through a dummy variable in the regressions, as well as 
(separately) for state-owned firms which are also foreign-owned.  
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
We report descriptive statistics in Table 4 and correlation coefficients in Table 5.  Our sample of firms in 
understudied countries primarily comprise small/medium sized domestic private firms; in Table 4, we 
note an average firm size of around 110 workers and a firm age of 18 years. Only 5.4% of firms are state-
owned, and only 5.6% are (majority) foreign owned, while the share of exports in revenues is typically 
small, 7.5%. On average, around one-third of FDI derives from other emerging and developing countries. 
Table 5 reveals that the correlation coefficients between the independent variables are almost all rather 
small, mostly well below 0.3, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a serious issue in our data. One 
exception is the positive correlation between FDI stock from developed economies and GDP per capita. 
However, in unreported regressions we find that omission of the former does not influence the results 
concerning the hypotheses, so we include both variables in our reported regressions. 
-Tables 4 & 5 about here- 
 
Hypothesis Testing  
 Given the fact that our data are not collected as a panel structure, we treat them as cross-sectional 
regardless of the date of sampling within one country. To test our hypotheses, we run regressions on the 
base sample (excluding state-owned and small firms) for each of the two dependent variables, 
productivity, and exports. We estimate five models. In the first, we include only the control variables; for 
model 2 we add the five configuration dummy variables (configs 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7) and for model 3 we 
include only the control variables and the ownership variables. Model 4, which is the basis for testing 
hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, includes all five configurations (config) dummies and ownership variables as well 
as the control variables. Finally, in model 5, which we use to test hypotheses 4 (as well as to provide 
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additional support for hypotheses 1 and 2), we add to the independent variables in model 4 the five 
interaction terms between the configuration dummies and the foreign ownership variable.  
The test for hypothesis 1 is whether there are significant differences in the value of the five 
coefficients on the configuration dummies within each of the export and productivity equations in model 
4. We first test whether the configs are different from the omitted category, configuration 5, by observing 
whether the coefficient on each configuration is statistically different from zero. We then test the null 
hypothesis, namely whether they are different from each other, by constraining the coefficients to equality 
using a nested F-test.  We test hypothesis 2 by using model 4 for the productivity and export equations 
respectively, and performing a pairwise comparison of the productivity versus the export equation 
coefficients for each configuration; that is, we compare configuration coefficients pairwise, across the 
productivity and export equations. 
The test of hypothesis 3 depends on the sign and significance of the coefficient on the foreign-
owned dummy in model 4; we argue that this will be positive and statistically significant. Finally, we 
base the test of hypothesis 4 on model 5. For each performance equation, we test whether the coefficients 
on the interactive ownership-configuration terms are statistically significantly different from each other.  
Once again, we first test whether they are each different from configuration 5, via the significance of the 
coefficient on each ownership-configuration interaction. We go on to test whether all the other 
ownership-configuration interaction coefficients in model 5 are different from one another by 
constraining the coefficients to equality.
8
 
Results for the base specification 
We report our results using the base specification sample in Table 6. The control variables alone in model 
1 provide an explanation of around 16% of the heterogeneity of productivity in our sample and 14% of 
                                                 
8
 As a robustness test, we also used Model 5 to test hypotheses 1 and 2, but this does not change the results discussed below. 
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exports. The explained variance increases to about 22% and 17% respectively once we add the 
configuration and ownership dummies and their interactions in model 5.  
-Table 6: about here- 
 
As outlined above, we use the results in models 4 and 5 to test our hypotheses. Commencing with 
hypothesis 1 (non-equifinality), we note that all five configuration dummies in both the productivity and 
export equations are statistically significantly different from the omitted category at the 99% level, which 
provides strong support for the hypothesis. Furthermore, we find in Table 7 (Panel A) that the coefficients 
on all the configuration dummies are statistically significantly different from each other at the 10% level 
except for the pairs of coefficients on configs 1 and 6 and on configs 2 and 3 in the productivity equation. 
Thus, we find evidence in support of hypothesis 1; by ranking the configurations in terms of contribution 
to firm performance
9
.  In Panel B of Table 7, we produce the ranking of configuration impact on 
performance, accounting for differences in statistical significance, and note that the ranking differs 
depending on whether we measure performance by productivity or exports.  
-Table 7: about here- 
 
 We test hypothesis 2 (Tversky) by comparing the configuration coefficients in model 4 in the 
productivity equation with those in the export equation. We report the tests results based on a chi-squared 
test Table 8, where we see that the coefficients are significantly different from each other in every 
configuration, except config 2. This result explains the different rankings of configuration reported in 
Table 7, Panel C, and thus these tests provide strong support for hypothesis 2. 
-Table 8: about here- 
 
 We test Hypothesis 3 through the sign and significance of the coefficient on the FOE dummy in 
the productivity and export equations in Model 4, Table 6. We note that both are positive and statistically 
                                                 
9
 It should be noted that while we chose to test the hypothesis using model 4, the coefficients and standard errors on the 
configuration do not alter greatly between models 2, 4 and 5, underlining the robustness of this result. 
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significant in model 4) for both equations, which provides strong support for hypothesis 3
10
. We test 
Hypothesis 4 by comparing the coefficients on the interactive ownership-configuration terms in model 5 
within each equation, and we report the results in Table 9. Panel A, reports the regression coefficients that 
we test. Here, we test for significant differences using the nested-F test and find significant differences 
between the coefficients in both equations. Thus, in the productivity equation, all five interactive 
ownership-configuration terms are significantly different from the omitted interaction term 
(FOE*configuration 5) at the 99% level. Furthermore, Table 9, Panel A shows that the coefficients on all 
the interactive ownership-configuration terms are statistically significantly different from each other 
except for the pairs of coefficients FOE*config1/FOE*config6 and FOE*config3/ FOE*config6. The 
same applies to the export equation except that the coefficient on FOE*config2 is negative and significant 
at the 95% rather than at the 99% level. Thus, we establish that this interactive term is significantly 
different from all the other interactive ownership-configuration terms without reference to the formal tests 
in Table 9. As suggested by Kingsley, Noordewier & Bergh (2017), we test the marginal effects of 
foreign ownership on productivity and exports in each configuration, reported in Table 9, Panels B, and 
these are also statistically significant.
11
 Thus, we find strong evidence in support of H4. 
-Table 9 about here- 
 Finally, turning to the control variables these largely conform to our expectations. In most models, 
productivity is positively related to firm age and size. However, it is interesting that we find that older 
firms export significantly less. The share of the FDI stock from developed economies raises both 
productivity and exports, while both are negatively associated with GDP per capita. Finally, ownership 
                                                 
10
 The simple estimated coefficient on FOE is estimated to be negative in model 5 of the productivity equation, but the full 
effect has to be calculated by taking into account the interactive effect with each of the configurations. Thus, in fact, foreign 
ownership only has a negative effect on productivity in the omitted configuration which is Emergent LMEs. 
11
 As noted above, the omitted category in all models is configuration 5, ELME. Thus, our marginal tests reported in Table 9 
Panel B on the interactive ownership-configuration in model 5 also treat omitted FOE* Con 5 as the reference category.  We 
have graphed the marginal effects across configurations but these provide no additional information and to save space are not 
provided. They are available upon request. 
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hybridity – the inverse of the concentration of ownership by ownership type, acts to reduce productivity 
but interestingly to increase exports. 
Robustness Tests 
We consider in unreported regressions 
12
 the results from the two broader samples. We first included 
small firms (< 10 workers), increasing the sample by around 30% on average, and more in fragmented 
and family-led configurations. The second sample included SOEs and increased the sample by 10%, more 
so in the state-led and hierarchically coordinated configurations. We re-estimated models 4 and 5 on these 
samples, and in both cases continued to find strong support for all four hypotheses.  
DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we first advance the literature on national institutional systems both empirically and 
theoretically, by focusing on the impact of these systems on the performance of firms from emerging and 
developing economies. At the same time, we contribute to the IB literature by exploring the performance 
of foreign-owned firms and the interaction between configuration-specific and their firm-specific 
advantages in a sample of understudied countries. We begin by discussing the implications of the 
relationship between national systems of institutions and host country firm-level performance for the 
literature on institutional and governance systems, before considering the impact on foreign-owned firms.  
National institutional systems and firm-level performance 
 We first contribute to this literature by testing and validating FJAS’s (2016) comprehensive 
taxonomy of institutional systems and demonstrate that the configurations provide an independent and 
statistically significant explanation of the variation in firm performance across countries. Thus, we show 
that these configurations matter in explanations of firm performance and thereby contribute to this line of 
research by addressing the comments that scholars have given more attention to the task of critiquing 
institutional typologies than to testing the frameworks (Peck & Zhang, 2013). Furthermore, FJAS’s 
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 Available from the authors on request. 
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varieties of institutional systems perspective introduce for understudied countries two new elements that 
are conspicuously absent from the VOC perspective and which are likely to influence firm performance: a 
more prominent role for the state and ownership structure notably in the form of concentrated and family 
ownership. 
 Secondly, our results shed light on the kinds of institutional arrangements that will support better 
enterprise performance. With its depiction of path-dependent institutional change (Hall & Thelan, 2009), 
the comparative capitalism literature has emphasized institutional continuity and the persistence of variety 
in capitalist structures (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). This characterization may be appropriate in the context of 
mature institutional settings, but less so in understudied countries which comprise a wide array of 
transitional, socialist, and authoritarian regimes. A firm-centered approach, such as ours, can inform 
debates about the evolution of institutional systems, and in particular “incremental institutional 
adjustments, and potential hybridization” (Jackson & Deeg, 2008: 542) that may emerge over time.  
 Our ranking results shed some preliminary and admittedly tentative light on these debates,  
suggesting a range of distinctive trajectories of institutional change and firm performance. For example, 
our evidence points to two relatively high-performing configurations: emergent LMEs (config 2) in which 
firms rank first in productivity but 5
th
 in exports, and collaborative agglomerations (config 6) in which 
firms ranked joint second in productivity and first in exports. We characterize the developmental 
trajectories of both configurations in dynamic terms where relatively strong-states are proactive in 
building complementarities to address institutional contradictions and seeking to develop a coherent 
market-based institutional framework. In these settings, where markets and other selection mechanisms 
are intensified, and domestic firms are incentivized to adapt and improve their practices,  high levels of 
performance can be achieved (Sinkovics et al., 2014). Indeed, FJAS’s characterization of these 
configurations (emergent LME, collaborative agglomerations) suggests convergence on the LME and 
CME varieties of capitalism, respectively. In the latter, a group of former socialist states with proximity 
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to, and growing economic integration with North European CME economies suggests a proces of national 
institutional isomorphism.  
 However, these are not the only relatively effective configurations in VIS. Based on their firm 
performance rankings, we identify two intermediate configurations: state-led systems (config 1, joint 
second on productivity and third in exporting), and hierarchically coordinated (config 7, second in 
exporting but equal fourth in productivity). FJAS characterize both as having a strong state, which plays a 
prominent role in resource allocation and in shaping the economic ordering of society. Concentrated and 
family ownership are also characteristic of both. However, strong states retain what Evans’ (1989) 
describes as embedded autonomy, and avoid dependence upon powerful oligarchs or family elites. 
Similarly, while the state mediates incentives and resources,  concentrated owners and family businesses 
possess the autonomy to pursue economic competitiveness that promotes their productivity and economic 
performance. The prominent role of the state and high exporting is suggestive of a government policy 
choice favoring export-oriented development, a well-trodden path for late-industrializing states (Amsden, 
1991). Importantly, neither appear to be converging on either the CME or LME varieties of capitalism. 
Instead, these variants may represent an alternative, hybridized form of state capitalism. This 
heterogenous group of countries may be depicted as autocratic and illiberal regimes pursuing liberal trade 
policies (Hankla & Kuthy, 2013). Many of the countries in these configurations are relatively stable 
single-party states with long time horizons and incentives to adopt open trade policies that improve long-
term economic performance. The implication is that state leadership of the economy becomes a 
permanent feature of these economic systems.  
  A third category is also evident in the rankings, one that is consistent with those scholars who 
identify economic systems characterized by institutional inertia, and even outright failure (Schneider 
2009; Wood & Frynas, 2006). These institutional settings may have become permanently settled into their 
foundations with the preservation of institutional contradictions and non-complementarity. Our results 
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identify two underperforming configurations with these characteristics: fragmented and fragile states 
(config 2) with lagging performance on both exports and productivity, and family led systems (config 3) 
also weak on productivity and exports. Fragmented and fragile states are economic systems with weak 
states that lack the capacities to furnish resources or otherwise close institutional voids. As borne out in 
our results, firms are very unlikely to achieve international levels of competitiveness in these economic 
systems. FJAS describe the diverse economies located in North Africa, central Asia, and Latin America 
comprising the family led systems in neutral terms. They suggest that ‘wealthy and dominant families 
take center stage in ownership, resource allocation and management’ and ‘wealthy families drive the 
economic agenda’(2016:10). However, Fogel (2006) depicts many of these states as oligarchic, where 
dominant families become entrenched and protect their interests, which can be achieved by frustrating 
pro-market policy initiatives and block entry from new rivals (Schneider, 2009). In these economic 
systems, the selection environment is relatively weak, and firms have few incentives to improve their 
competitiveness.  
 Thus, measuring institutional configurations regarding firm-level performance suggests evidence 
of both institutional convergence and persistence as well as pointing to the possibility of hybridized forms 
of state capitalism, which hold the promise of improved levels of firm-level and macroeconomic 
performance. In this sense, our findings address the question of institutional equifinality among emerging 
market and transitional economies and confirm our hypothesis that firms in different institutional 
configurations will operate at different levels of economic performance. 
Although our findings therefore strongly support our hypothesis that there is non-equifinality 
between these novel VIS configurations, the exact rankings depend on the performance measure chosen. 
We explore this phenomenon more formally through what we refer to as the Tversky effect, where we find 
evidence supporting our hypothesis that the firm-level performance effects of institutional configurations 
differ according to the performance measure chosen. An important implication is that the attractiveness of 
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a country may be evaluated differently by a potential investor if the investment is part of an export 
platform to feed a global supply chain rather than an investment in capacity to meet local market demand. 
There are also relevant research ramifications, especially for researchers who are interested in the 
performance attributes of institutional systems. Our arguments show that the choice of performance 
measure to evaluate the comparative efficiency of different institutional systems may determine the 
conclusions reached. Finally, there are implications for the generation of comparative institutional data. In 
practice, panels of experts or polls of informed individuals derive many indicators of institutional systems 
(including the FJAS indicators).  The implication of our finding is therefore that these expert ratings may 
be subject to unobservable judgement bias when presented with different scenarios. Comparative 
institutional research makes extensive use of institutional quality measures applying expert rating 
methodologies; examples include the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Rankings, International 
Country Risk Guide, and Freedom House. In the light of our findings, these measures need be selected 
carefully and interpreted cautiously.  
Institutional configurations and foreign ownership  
Our second contribution is to the IB literature.  We build our analysis on the OLI framework and the 
argument that for developing and emerging economies as well as developed ones, FOE success abroad 
depends on both the ability to create and transfer ownership advantages and on the ability of the firm to 
match its FSA to the location advantages of the host market.  
Thus, our third hypothesis was that FOEs translated their FSAs into performance advantages 
when locating in understudied countries, a hypothesis confirmed for both productivity and exports (Table 
6, Model 4). It is important to establish theoretically and empirically that FOEs in understudied countries 
characterized by challenging institutional circumstances nevertheless do on average enjoy a performance 
premium associated with their FSAs transferred abroad, especially as a basis for a more fine-grained 
analysis of the effects of national institutional systems on firm performance. Moreover, given that some 
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one-third of FDI in our sample countries originates from emerging economies, our results suggest that 
FSAs as a basis for internationalization are not unique to MNEs from developed countries. Future 
research should focus on achieving a better understanding of these FSAs giving particular attention to the 
non-traditional advantages of emerging market multinationals that previous studies have identified 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Ramamurti, 2009; Bhaumik, Driffield & Zhou, 2016).
13
 We interpret our 
results as providing support for a traditional OLI approach to understanding the nature of the MNE 
operating in developing economies, with the caveat that O advantages might be different for EMNEs.    
The analysis around hypothesis 3 also contributes to the literature on comparative corporate 
governance by showing that governance and ownership are important in explaining firm performance. In 
this regard, we follow Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera (2016) who call for increased attention to ownership 
structure and its relationship to economic performance in different economies. Specifically, our data on 
performance and ownership responds to their call for future research that uses firm-specific microdata on 
ownership structures to better understand the cross-national diversity in performance outcomes. Because 
our dataset applies a standard survey methodology across countries, we can make reliable estimates of 
ownership and performance attributes of firms located in very different institutional settings.  
We go on in Hypothesis 4 to explore whether these performance advantages of FOEs vary by 
configuration. Our analysis extends Hennart’s (2009; 2012) argument that access to country-specific 
advantages is not free, and will vary by host country and so the performance of foreign firms is 
contingent on their ability to choose locations that best match their FSAs. If configurations do indeed 
share important institutional similarities, then this argument leads one also to expect configuration-
specific advantages, and hence that the performance of FOEs will be configuration specific. Our results 
provide support for the argument.  Put differently; our results indicate that locational (L) advantages 
cannot be considered as solely country-specific because groups of countries share certain institutional 
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 Our data do not allow us to identify at the firm-level the home country of the foreign investor. 
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characteristics that distinguish them from others and impact firm performance. Thus, the notion of 
country-specific advantage must be extended to include configuration-specific advantages. Among other 
things, this way of thinking also provides opportunities to re-examine the issue of locational and entry 
mode choice from a configuration perspective, and suggests that the widespread use of institutional-
distance measures between countries as a determinant should be reconsidered to take into account the 
institutional distance between configurations of countries. 
By suggesting that some institutional systems are better able to support FDI, our fourth hypothesis 
complements insights from hypothesis one and two, because it results in a ranking of institutional 
configurations that depends on the performance measure chosen (Table 9, Panels B). However, it also 
extends the analysis by suggesting a mechanism through which configurations differ, and it introduces a 
possible link between firm governance and systems governance that researchers have not yet studied. 
Both offer opportunities for future research. 
 As a starting point, future research could focus on spillovers from FOEs to the host economy 
(Meyer & Sinani, 2009). If foreign ownership performance effects are sensitive to the particular 
configuration in which a country is located, then domestic performance effects may also be further 
enhanced by spillovers from foreign-owned firms (Witt & Jackson, 2016; World Bank, 2018).  Our 
results are suggestive in this regard. For example, considering productivity, we note that the performance 
of majority-owned FOEs is highest in config 2, the fragmented economies of Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
lowest in config 5, emergent LMEs; the opposite of the rankings found in the estimates without foreign 
ownership interactive effects (Table 9, Panel B). This result suggests the possibility that spillover benefits 
are lower in Sub-Saharan Africa, in turn suggesting a mechanism explaining the poor productivity 
performance of that configuration. 
 At the same time, our results also suggest that the export performance of majority-owned FOEs is 
strongest in the state-led, collaborative agglomeration, and hierarchically-coordinated configurations 
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(Table 9, Panel B), the same ranking as was found in the estimates without the foreign ownership 
interactive terms (Table 7, Panel B).  These results suggest possible links between institutional 
governance at the configuration level, namely the degree of state involvement in export-driven industrial 
policy, and the relative performance of firms by ownership type.  The prominent role of the state in these 
institutional systems suggests that state involvement can be particularly advantageous for FOEs. We have 
emphasised the potential for both direct effects on FOE performance and the strong possibility for 
indirect ones because national institutional systems may influence spillovers.  The possibility leads us to 
suggest that the institutional theory of the supply side of the economy that examines how institutions 
shape the supply of inputs such as skills and capital collectively available to firms (Jackson and Deeg, 
2008) might be extended to encompass configurations. Thus, the MNE might be considered part of the 
supply-side in understudied countries notably concerning productivity-enhancing skills and practices. 
 We conclude by acknowledging some limitations of this study and providing some further 
guidance for future research. Our study faces limitations at both the theoretical and empirical levels. 
Commencing with theory, we have followed the literature in basing our classification of institutional 
systems upon taxonomies, which derive their classificatory distinctions from empirically observed 
clusters of characteristics, rather than from an underlying conceptualization as would be the basis for a 
typology. Given that understudied economies are typically evolving rapidly and are often subject to 
significant institutional changes, sometimes related to revolution, civil war or major economic and social 
development (Collier, 2007), our taxonomies may provide an unstable basis for long-term analysis. 
Furthermore, we have chosen to base our study on the VIS classification, with our contribution primarily 
focused towards exploring the complex inter-relationships among institutional systems, enterprise 
governance system, and firm performance. While our research has provided some evidence of the validity 
of the VIS taxonomy in explaining firm performance in understudied economies, future researchers may 
wish to revisit the taxonomy itself to explore whether cluster analysis based on a richer characterization 
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of institutions can provide an equally valid but more fine-grained specification of institutional systems in 
understudied economies. Also, we have not addressed the question of institutional dynamics and 
institutional change, which can affect firm performance (Kafouros & Aliyev, 2016) and firm ownership 
(Driffield, Mickiewicz & Temouri, 2016), and in turn change configuration identity and impact. 
On the empirical side, we have benefitted from the World Bank’s vast data collection exercise at 
the enterprise level on understudied economies. However, the WBES dataset also imposes some 
limitations. Most importantly, though there are a few countries surveyed three times, the bulk of the 
dataset comprises either single year observations or observations from only two waves. This has made it 
impossible to use empirical methods that distinguish between firm-level, country-level, and configuration 
effects. Future work may, therefore, need to seek either panel data for understudied economies or focus 
primarily on the countries with three waves to explore these distinctions. Furthermore, the data do have 
certain limitations, with respect to performance and ownership measures, and future research should 
investigate ways to improve these measures. Our analysis would, in particular, be improved by using a 
measure of total factor productivity and by being able to identify the country of origin of foreign-owned 
firms. Moreover, while our results point to the effective transfer of FSAs, even in an environment where 
transaction costs are high, as the explanation for the superior performance of majority-owned FOEs, we 
cannot in this study identify the nature of the FSAs, nor distinguish those possessed by EMNEs from 
other foreign investors. At the same time, while we identify clear configuration-specific effects on the 
performance of FOEs, these differ by performance measure, and we have not at this stage been able to 
identify the exact reasons. These are important limitations of our analysis. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 In summary, we propose and find evidence for the argument that national institutional systems 
provide an additional and significant explanation of the firm performance in understudied countries. We 
do not observe equifinality in that some configurations are more supportive of positive firm performance 
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than others. Moreover, the degree to which configurations impact firm performance depends on the 
performance measure chosen; we use two key measures – productivity and exporting. Thus, we find 
configurations to be important, but their effects to be context dependent. Finally, we provide evidence 
that one mechanism contributing to the heterogeneous impact of configurations on firm performance is 
that some configurations are better able to support the FSAs of foreign-owned firms.  Our analysis 
indicates that the traditional focus on the interaction of firm and country effects as joint determinants of 
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Table 2: World Bank Enterprise Survey Sample Countries within the VIS Configuration Structure and Number of Firms in each Country 









Country Freq. Country Freq. Country Freq. Country Freq. Country Freq. Country Freq. 
Argentina 2,117 Angola 785 Azerbaijan 770 Botswana 610 Czech Republic 504 Bulgaria 1,596 
Bangladesh 2,946 Cameroon 363 Brazil 1,802 Chile 2,050 Estonia 546 Georgia 733 
Belarus 633 DR Congo 1,228 Colombia 1,942 Israel 483 Hungary 601 Jordan 573 
China 2,700 Egypt 2,897 Mexico 2,960 Namibia 909 Latvia 607 Kazakhstan 1,144 
India 9,281 Ethiopia 1,492 Morocco 407 South Africa 937 Lithuania 546 Lebanon 561 
Indonesia 2,764 Ghana 1,214 Nigeria 4,567     Poland 997 Romania 1,081 
Malaysia 1,000 Kenya 1,438 Peru 1,632     Slovak  543 Turkey 2,496 
Mongolia 722 Rwanda 453 Tunisia 592     Slovenia 546 Ukraine 1,853 
Pakistan 2,182 Senegal 1,107 Yemen 830         
 
  
Philippines 2,661 Sudan 662             
 
  
Russia 5,224 Tanzania 1,232             
 
  
Sri Lanka 610 Uganda 1,325             
 
  
Thailand 1,000                 
 
  
Venezuela 820                 
 
  
Vietnam 2,049                 
 
  
                    
 
  






















Table 3: Definitions and Sources of Variables   
Variable Definition Source 
Productivity (Log) 
Labor productivity is real sales (using GDP 
deflators) divided by full-time permanent workers 
WEBS 
Export (% of total sales 
that are exported directly)  
Sales exported directly as percentage of total sales. WEBS 
Firm Age(Log) 
Year firm began operation to year of survey 
conducted 
WEBS 
Firm Size (Log) Log of  number of permanent workers WEBS 
% of FDI stock from 
Developed Economies 
(Log) 
Percentage of FDI from developed countries to 
source economy  
UNCTAD's Bilateral FDI 
Statistics 
GDP per Capita (Log) 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided 
by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross 
value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. 
It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion 
and degradation of natural resources. Data are in 
current U.S. dollars. The variable is loaded in logs.  





Where i can be state foreign or domestic non-state 
Calculated from WEBS 
variables 
FOE majority owned 
(Dummy) 
Firms with foreign owner hold more than 50% of 
ownership 
SOE majority owned 
(Dummy) 
Firms with state hold more than 50% of ownership 
FOE SOE JV (Dummy) Firms with foreign and state Joint Venture 
1/ ∑ 𝑖[(
𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑖 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟







Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Labor Productivity(Log) 13.60 2.79 -3.40 29.00 
Export (% of total sales that are exported directly)  7.548 22.06 0 100 
Firm Age 17.72 14.91 0 210 
Firm Size  112.5 514.9 0 37772 
% of FDI stock from Developed Economies 64.73 24.01 0 99 
GDP per Capita 5597.76 5338.56 246.803 36281.2 
Ownership Hybridity 1.0497 0.2261 1 4 
FOE majority owned (Dummy) 0.0558 0.2296 0 1 
SOE majority owned (Dummy) 0.0054 0.073 0 1 






Table 5: Correlation Coefficients 
 Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Labor Productivity (Log) 1 
     
    
2 Export -0.0031 1 
     
  
3 Firm Age (Log) 0.0268* 0.0608* 1 
    
  
4 Firm Size (Log) 0.0419* 0.2969* 0.2712* 1 
   
  
5 GDP per Capita (Log) -0.1895* 0.0133* 0.0668* 0.0574* 1 
  
  
6 % of FDI stock (Log) -0.0887* 0.0262* 0.0755* 0.0011 0.4052* 1 
 
  
7 Ownership Hybridity 0.0011 0.1021* 0.0427* 0.1202* 0.0176* -0.0175* 1   
8 FOE majority owned 0.0545* 0.1838* -0.0088 0.1670* 0.0079 0.0108* 0.1089* 1 
9 SOE majority owned 0.0313* -0.0028 0.0390* 0.0750* 0.0087 -0.0369* 0.1377* -0.0178* 
10 Con1 (State led) 0.2104* 0.0291* 0.0602* 0.1444* -0.1114* -0.1294* -0.0334* -0.0588* 
11 Con2 (Fragmented) 0.0378* -0.0686* -0.1073* -0.1277* -0.4950* -0.2545* 0.0064 0.0484* 
12 Con3 (Family led) -0.1171* -0.0346* 0.0309* -0.0559* 0.0759* 0.1233* 0.0526* -0.0278* 
13 Con5 (LME) 0.0655* -0.0235* 0.0332* 0.0032 0.2196* 0.0474* -0.0067 0.0654* 
14 Con6 (Collaborative) -0.0878* 0.0558* 0.0198* -0.0225* 0.3516* 0.1787* -0.0032 0.0461* 
15 Con7 (Hierarchically) -0.2235* 0.0524* -0.0445* 0.005 0.2398* 0.1671* -0.0108* -0.0129* 
 
 
Variable  8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
8 FOE majority owned 1 
      
  
9 SOE majority owned -0.0178* 1 
     
  
10 Con1 (State led) -0.0588* 0.0288* 1 
    
  
11 Con2 (Fragmented) 0.0484* -0.0090* -0.3816* 1 
   
  
12 Con3 (Family led) -0.0278* -0.0116* -0.4024* -0.2076* 1 
  
  
13 Con5 (LME) 0.0654* -0.0141* -0.2130* -0.1099* -0.1159* 1 
 
  
14 Con6 (Collaborative) 0.0461* -0.0015 -0.2108* -0.1087* -0.1146* -0.0607* 1   
15 Con7 (Hierarchically) -0.0129* -0.0088* -0.3120* -0.1609* -0.1697* -0.0898* -0.0889* 1 
  *p <0.01 





Table 6: Regression Results; Base Sample Excludes Small and State Firms 
Variable Labor Productivity(Log) as Dependent Variable   Export as Dependent Variable 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Firm Age (Log) 0.0494***  -0.0095 0.0588*** -0.0024  -0.0054 
 
 -0.889*** -0.909***  -0.558*** -0.602*** -0.534*** 
   (0.0151) (0.0147) (0.0152) (0.0147) (0.0147) 
 
 (0.1285) (0.1285) (0.1273) (0.1273) (0.127) 
Firm Size (Log) 0.0600*** 0.0397*** 0.0498*** 0.0302***  0.0308*** 
 
5.4289***  5.378*** 4.8621***  4.789*** 4.7424*** 
  (0.0092) (0.0089) (0.0094) (0.009)  (0.009) 
 
(0.0784) (0.0782)  (0.0791) (0.0788) (0.0786) 
% of FDI stock  0.3067***  0.4882*** 0.3053*** 0.4819***  0.4876*** 
 
0.5939** 0.6621**  0.5557** 0.4739* 0.5695* 
   (0.0254) (0.0256) (0.0254) (0.0256) (0.0256) 
 
(0.2149) (0.2228) (0.2125) (0.2203)  (0.2197) 
GDP per Capita -0.8510*** -1.162*** -0.848***  -1.153***  -1.154*** 
 
0.11 -1.762***  0.2021 -1.566***  -1.829*** 
  (0.0152)  (0.0215) (0.0152) (0.0215)  (0.0215) 
 









 2.757*** 1.1257* 
















































































 (0.5467)  (0.5684) 
FOE majority  
  
0.4196*** 0.3350***  -1.117*** 
   
13.702***  13.699** 6.6658***  
  
  
(0.045) (0.0436) (0.1359) 
   
(0.3807) (0.3803) (1.1964) 
Ownership  
  
-0.261***  -0.1293* -0.1317* 
   
 4.2128*** 4.7218*** 4.7354*** 
Hybridity 
  
(0.0603) (0.0583)  (0.0583) 
   
(0.5153) (0.5131) (0.5121) 
FOE* Con1 
    
1.6183*** 
     
13.9*** 
  
    
(0.1535) 
     
 (1.3525) 
FOE* Con2 
    
2.1372*** 
     
-4.16** 
  
    
(0.1659) 
     
 (1.4441) 
FOE* Con3 
    
1.3612*** 
     
5.5532*** 
  
    
(0.1722) 
     
(1.5224) 
FOE* Con6 
    
1.5787*** 
     
9.7559*** 
  
    
(0.1906) 
     
(1.6572) 
FOE* Con7 
    
 0.9731*** 
     
12.911*** 
  
    
(0.1902) 
     
(1.6466) 
Constant   18.962*** 25.251***  21.074**  26.029**  25.896*** 
 
-11.19*** 3.6492  -11.03***  1.3804 -1.7196 
  (0.1924) (0.2669)  (0.2071) (0.2758) (0.2623) 
 
 (1.6814) (2.3271)  (1.666) (2.2493) (2.2529) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 52990 52990  52966 52966 52966 
 
58923 58923 58894  58894 58894 
F 365.440 454.670 345.71  431.66  383.65 
 
339.05  311.07  372.82 343.11  311.47 





Table 7: Test of Equality of coefficients on Configurations in Model 4 
Panel A. Within equation pairwise T-test 
Labor Productivity as Dependent Variable 
  Con1 Con2 Con3  Con6 Con7 
Con1 
    
  
Con2 492.94*** 
   
  
Con3  516.97*** 0.84 
  
  
Con6 1.9 180.84*** 229.94*** 
 
  
Con7 233.28*** 5.07* 3.01 199.53***   
Export as Dependent Variable 
  Con1 Con2 Con3  Con6 Con7 
Con1 
    
  
Con2 296.02*** 
   
  
Con3  28.35*** 105.27*** 
  
  
Con6 240.63*** 535.68*** 366.7*** 
 
  
Con7 10.88** 225.73*** 54.04*** 191.82***   
*p< 0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 





Con1 (State led) Equal 2
nd
  3rd 
Con2 (Fragmented) Equal 4
th
  6th 
Con3 (Family led) Equal 4
th




Con6 (Collaborative) Equal 2
nd
  1st 
Con7 (Hierarchically) Equal 4
th
  2nd 
 
Note: 
1. Table 7 provides additional results for non-equifinality hypothesis (H1) in model 4.  
2. Panel A presents pairwise T-test in Model 4 on five configurations dummies. The number denotes F-
ratio as the difference between two configuration dummies in the same model. The asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and, ∗ 
denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
3. Panel B depicts configuration impacts on two performance outcomes by ranking the coefficients of 







Table 8: Comparing Regression Coefficients between Labor Productivity and Export (H2) 
Configuration Chi2 P value Rank 
Con1 (State led) 109.17 0.0000 3rd 
Con2 (Fragmented) 0.22 0.6398 5th 
Con3 (Family led) 95.69 0.0000 4th 
Con6 (Collaborative) 442.77 0.0000 1st 
Con7 (Hierarchically) 177.95 0.0000 2nd 
 
Note: 
1. Table 8 provides primary results for the Tversky hypothesis (H2) in model 4.  
2. Post-estimation test compares the coefficient of each configuration across models on two performance 
outcomes, respectively. Chi2 with statistical P-value denotes significant difference between coefficients across 







Table 9: Tests of Equality of Coefficients on FOE*configuration Interactions in Model 5 
Panel A. Within equation pairwise T-test (H4) 
Labor Productivity as Dependent Variable 
  FOE * Con1 FOE * Con2 FOE * Con3 FOE * Con6 FOE * Con7 
FOE * Con1           
FOE * Con2 18.74***         
FOE * Con3 4.04* 29.4***       
FOE * Con6  0.07 11.5*** 1.62     
FOE * Con7 18.19*** 50.28*** 5.19* 10.29**   
Export as Dependent Variable 
  FOE * Con1 FOE * Con2 FOE * Con3 FOE * Con6 FOE * Con7 
FOE * Con1           
FOE * Con2 305.74***         
FOE * Con3 54.04*** 60.59***       
FOE * Con6 10.01** 97.62***  7.99**     
FOE * Con7 0.58 149.78*** 24.89*** 3.83   
    *p< 0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 9: Panel B. Marginal Effects of FOE (Model 5 Interaction) 




1. Table 9 provides primary result for moderation hypothesis (H4) in model 5.  
2. Panel A presents pairwise T-test in Model 5 on five interactive ownership-configuration terms. The 
number denotes F-ratio as the difference between two interaction terms in the same equation. The asterisks ∗∗∗, 
∗∗ and, ∗ denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
3. Panel B depicts marginal effects of five interaction terms vary on two performance outcomes, 
respectively. The ranking is based on coefficients of interaction terms. 
 
Labor Productivity Export 
 
Marginal Effect P value| Rank 
 
Marginal Effect  P value| Rank 
FOE * Con1 0.501 0.000 2nd FOE * Con1 20.566 0.000 1st 
FOE * Con2 1.020 0.000 1st FOE * Con2 2.506 0.002 5th 
FOE * Con3 0.244 0.023 4th FOE * Con3 12.219 0.000 4th 
FOE * Con6 0.461 0.001 3rd FOE * Con6 16.422 0.000 3rd 
FOE * Con7 -0.145 0.279 5th FOE * Con7 19.576 0.000 2nd 
